For decades, scientific research occupied a marginal position in primary Community law, lacking an autonomous legal basis until the Single European Act of 1986. Over the following forty years, through nine generations of Framework Programmes, it progressively assumed a central role in the architecture of European integration, evolving from a tool of defensive industrial policy into a strategic pillar enshrined in the Treaty of Lisbon as a constitutive objective of the European Research Area. Horizon Europe, with a budget of €95.5 billion for the period 2021–2027, represents the most mature outcome of this evolution: the principal instrument through which the EU supports the scientific excellence of its Member States and, at the same time, one of the most selective and competitive resource allocation mechanisms ever built at the supranational level. In this context, examining the positioning of the Italian research system within the European competition for direct funding acquires an analytical relevance that extends well beyond the purely statistical dimension. Italy is the third-largest economy in Europe, with a scientific output that consistently ranks above the continental average in terms of citation impact: one would therefore expect a competitive presence proportionate to this weight. The data on Horizon 2020 and Horizon Europe reveal instead a more complex picture, in which the scientific quality of the system does not automatically translate into competitiveness within European funding mechanisms. This thesis analyses the determinants of this asymmetry, drawing on a theoretical framework that grounds competitive research funding in the public good nature of science and employs the Matthew Effect literature to explain the mechanisms of cumulative competitive advantage concentration across national systems. To understand the reasons behind Italy's competitive underperformance, the study adopts a comparative approach, benchmarking the Italian system against two cases selected for their structurally distinct characteristics. Germany represents the benchmark of consolidated stability: consistently above 3% of GDP invested in R&D, a coherent institutional ecosystem linking universities, large non-university research organisations and high-tech industry. Spain, by contrast, represents a case of policy-driven catching-up: starting from lower levels of R&D investment than Italy, it has deliberately repositioned itself within the European research system through targeted investments in the organisational structures supporting European participation, achieving systematically superior results. The comparison enables the progressive exclusion of the most immediate explanations in order to identify the organisational and institutional determinants of Italy's competitive lag. The results show that the Italian system displays a condition of systematic underperformance, manifesting along three distinct dimensions: success rates consistently below the European average, a share of funding structurally below the country's economic weight, and an internal geographical concentration that leaves the southern Italian university system almost entirely absent from European competition. The analysis demonstrates that this condition is rooted in the system's institutional absorptive capacity: the structural deficit of grant management offices in universities, the pervasive precariousness of pre-tenure academic careers, national bureaucratic constraints, and the weakness of the university–industry relationship. The conclusions indicate that improving Italy's competitiveness does not necessarily require a proportional increase in aggregate R&D investment, but rather targeted interventions on the organisational and institutional conditions within which the scientific quality already present in the system is called to operate.
La ricerca scientifica ha occupato per decenni una posizione marginale nel diritto primario comunitario, priva di base giuridica autonoma fino all'Atto Unico Europeo del 1986. Nel corso dei quarant'anni successivi, attraverso nove generazioni di Programmi Quadro, essa ha progressivamente assunto un ruolo centrale nell'architettura dell'integrazione europea, trasformandosi da strumento di politica industriale difensiva a pilastro strategico codificato nel Trattato di Lisbona come obiettivo costitutivo dello Spazio Europeo della Ricerca. Horizon Europe, con una dotazione di 95,5 miliardi di euro per il periodo 2021-2027, rappresenta l'esito più maturo di questa evoluzione: il principale strumento attraverso cui l'UE sostiene l'eccellenza scientifica dei propri Stati membri e al tempo stesso uno dei meccanismi di allocazione delle risorse più selettivi e competitivi mai costruiti a livello sovranazionale. In questo contesto, interrogarsi sul posizionamento del sistema della ricerca italiano nella competizione europea per i finanziamenti diretti acquista una rilevanza analitica che va oltre il solo dato statistico. L'Italia rappresenta la terza economia europea, con una produzione scientifica che per impatto citazionale si colloca stabilmente al di sopra della media continentale: ci si aspetterebbe dunque una presenza competitiva proporzionata a questo peso. I dati su Horizon 2020 e Horizon Europe restituiscono invece un quadro più articolato, in cui la qualità scientifica del sistema non si traduce automaticamente in competitività nei meccanismi di finanziamento europeo. La presente tesi analizza le determinanti di questa asimmetria muovendo da un quadro teorico che fonda il finanziamento competitivo della ricerca sulla sua natura di bene pubblico e che utilizza la letteratura sul Matthew Effect per spiegare i meccanismi di concentrazione cumulativa del vantaggio competitivo tra sistemi nazionali. Per comprendere le ragioni del ritardo competitivo italiano, il lavoro adotta un approccio comparato, confrontando il sistema italiano con due casi selezionati per le loro caratteristiche strutturalmente distinte. La Germania rappresenta il benchmark della stabilità consolidata: investimenti in R&S costantemente oltre il 3% del PIL, un ecosistema istituzionale coerente tra università, grandi centri di ricerca non universitari e industria ad alta intensità tecnologica. La Spagna rappresenta invece un caso di catching-up guidato dalla policy: pur partendo da livelli di investimento inferiori a quelli italiani, ha modificato deliberatamente la propria collocazione nel sistema europeo della ricerca attraverso investimenti mirati nelle strutture organizzative di supporto alla partecipazione europea, raggiungendo risultati sistematicamente superiori. Il confronto consente di escludere progressivamente le spiegazioni più immediate per identificare le determinanti organizzative e istituzionali. I risultati mostrano che il sistema italiano presenta una condizione di sistematica sottoperformance, che si manifesta lungo tre dimensioni distinte: tassi di successo sistematicamente inferiori alla media europea, una quota di finanziamenti strutturalmente al di sotto del peso economico del Paese e una concentrazione geografica interna che lascia il sistema universitario meridionale quasi completamente assente dalla competizione europea. L'analisi dimostra che questa condizione risiede risiede nella capacità di assorbimento istituzionale del sistema: il deficit strutturale di grant management negli atenei, la precarizzazione trasversale della carriera pre-ruolo, i vincoli burocratici nazionali e la debolezza del legame università-industria. Le conclusioni indicano che i margini di miglioramento non richiedono necessariamente un incremento equivalente degli investimenti aggregati in R&S, ma interventi mirati sulle condizioni organizzative e istituzionali entro cui la qualità scientifica già presente è chiamata a operare.
La competitività del sistema della ricerca italiano nel contesto europeo: un'analisi economico-organizzativa della partecipazione a Horizon Europe
CHIAROTTO, LUDOVICA
2025/2026
Abstract
For decades, scientific research occupied a marginal position in primary Community law, lacking an autonomous legal basis until the Single European Act of 1986. Over the following forty years, through nine generations of Framework Programmes, it progressively assumed a central role in the architecture of European integration, evolving from a tool of defensive industrial policy into a strategic pillar enshrined in the Treaty of Lisbon as a constitutive objective of the European Research Area. Horizon Europe, with a budget of €95.5 billion for the period 2021–2027, represents the most mature outcome of this evolution: the principal instrument through which the EU supports the scientific excellence of its Member States and, at the same time, one of the most selective and competitive resource allocation mechanisms ever built at the supranational level. In this context, examining the positioning of the Italian research system within the European competition for direct funding acquires an analytical relevance that extends well beyond the purely statistical dimension. Italy is the third-largest economy in Europe, with a scientific output that consistently ranks above the continental average in terms of citation impact: one would therefore expect a competitive presence proportionate to this weight. The data on Horizon 2020 and Horizon Europe reveal instead a more complex picture, in which the scientific quality of the system does not automatically translate into competitiveness within European funding mechanisms. This thesis analyses the determinants of this asymmetry, drawing on a theoretical framework that grounds competitive research funding in the public good nature of science and employs the Matthew Effect literature to explain the mechanisms of cumulative competitive advantage concentration across national systems. To understand the reasons behind Italy's competitive underperformance, the study adopts a comparative approach, benchmarking the Italian system against two cases selected for their structurally distinct characteristics. Germany represents the benchmark of consolidated stability: consistently above 3% of GDP invested in R&D, a coherent institutional ecosystem linking universities, large non-university research organisations and high-tech industry. Spain, by contrast, represents a case of policy-driven catching-up: starting from lower levels of R&D investment than Italy, it has deliberately repositioned itself within the European research system through targeted investments in the organisational structures supporting European participation, achieving systematically superior results. The comparison enables the progressive exclusion of the most immediate explanations in order to identify the organisational and institutional determinants of Italy's competitive lag. The results show that the Italian system displays a condition of systematic underperformance, manifesting along three distinct dimensions: success rates consistently below the European average, a share of funding structurally below the country's economic weight, and an internal geographical concentration that leaves the southern Italian university system almost entirely absent from European competition. The analysis demonstrates that this condition is rooted in the system's institutional absorptive capacity: the structural deficit of grant management offices in universities, the pervasive precariousness of pre-tenure academic careers, national bureaucratic constraints, and the weakness of the university–industry relationship. The conclusions indicate that improving Italy's competitiveness does not necessarily require a proportional increase in aggregate R&D investment, but rather targeted interventions on the organisational and institutional conditions within which the scientific quality already present in the system is called to operate.| File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14251/8243